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Merit aid, a discount to college costs contingent upon academic per-
formance, is nothing new. Colleges and private organizations have long
rewarded high-achieving, college-bound high school students with schol-
arships. For example, the privately funded National Merit Scholarship
program, established in 1955, annually awards grants to 8,000 entering col-
lege freshmen who perform exceptionally on a standardized test. Private
colleges have long used merit scholarships to lure students with strong aca-
demic credentials.
While merit aid has a long history in the private sector, it has not played
a major role in the public sector. Historically, government subsidies to col-
lege students have not been merit based. At the federal level, aid has been
need based and strongly focused on low-income students. Eligibility for the
two largest federal aid programs, the Pell Grant and Staﬀord Loan, is de-
termined by a complex formula that deﬁnes ﬁnancial need on the basis of
income, assets, and family size. The formula is quite progressive: 90 percent
of dependent students who receive federal grants grew up in families with
incomes less than $40,000.1
At the state level, subsidies for college students have historically taken
the form of low tuition at public college and universities. Most states have
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1. Calculated from data in National Center for Education Statistics (1998a, table 314).long had some form of merit aid, but these programs have traditionally
been small and limited to the most elite students. For example, New York
rewards each high school’s top scorer on the Regents exam with a scholar-
ship. While such small merit programs abound, the vast bulk of state
spending on higher education takes the form of low tuition, made possible
by the $50 billion in subsidies that states annually provide their postsec-
ondary institutions. These institutional subsidies are highest at the ﬂagship
universities, which draw the highest-achieving students. In this sense, these
institutional subsidies are, by far, the largest “merit aid” program in the
United States. Access to this state subsidy has traditionally been controlled
not by state governments but by the schools, who decide which students are
suﬃciently meritorious to gain admission.
Recently, however, state legislatures have gotten into the business of
deﬁning academic merit and awarding merit aid to hundreds of thousands
of students. Since the early 1990s, more than a dozen states have estab-
lished broad-based merit aid programs. The typical program awards tu-
ition and fees to young residents who have maintained a modest grade
point average in high school. Many require a high school grade point aver-
age (GPA) of 3.0 or above, not a particularly high threshold: In 1999, 40
percent of high school seniors met this standard.2 Georgia, for example,
gives a free ride at its public colleges and universities to residents who have
a GPA of 3.0 in high school.3 In Arkansas, the GPA cutoﬀ is 2.5, exceeded
by 60 percent of high school students.
This new breed of merit aid diﬀers from the old style in both its breadth
and, plausibly, its eﬀect on students’ decisions. The old style of merit aid
was aimed at top students, whose decision to attend college is not likely to
be contingent upon the receipt of a scholarship. By design, if not by intent,
this elite form of merit aid goes to students whose operative decision is not
whether to attend college, but which high-quality, four-year college to
choose. By contrast, the new, broad-based merit aid programs are open to
students with solid although not necessarily exemplary academic records.
Such students may be uncertain about whether to go to college at all. When
oﬀered a well-publicized, generous scholarship, some of these students
may decide to give college a try. Even among students who would have
gone to college without the scholarship, the incentives of merit aid may
have an eﬀect on schooling decisions. For example, some may choose a
four-year school over a two-year school, or a private school over a public
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2. As I will discuss later in the paper, this ﬁgure varies quite dramatically by race and eth-
nicity. Source: Author’s calculations from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY). This is the share of students with a senior yearGPA of at least 3.0 and so is probably
an upper bound on the share of students who achieve this GPA for their entire high school ca-
reer. Unfortunately, NLSY does not contain GPA data for the entire high school career.
3. As the paper will discuss, the merit programs require that a high level of academic per-
formance be maintained in college. In Georgia, a GPA of 3.0 must be maintained in college,
a considerably higher hurdle than a 3.0 in high school.school.4 Those students planning to go to college out of state may instead
decide to stay closer to home in order to take advantage of a merit schol-
arship.
This chapter will examine how merit aid aﬀects this array of schooling
decisions, using household survey data to measure the impact of the new
state programs. I start with a case study of the Georgia Helping Outstand-
ing Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Scholarship, the namesake and inspira-
tion of many of the new state programs. I then extend the analysis to other
states that now have broad-based, HOPE-like programs. In the empirical
analysis, I pay particular attention to how the eﬀect of merit aid has varied
by race and ethnicity.
Merit aid might aﬀect the decisions not only of students but also of in-
stitutions. Do colleges increase their tuition prices, in order to capture
some of the subsidy? Do they reduce other forms of aid? Does the linkage
of scholarships to grades lead to grade inﬂation at high schools and col-
leges? A number of studies have addressed these questions, and I will re-
view the evidence on these topics. Finally, I will brieﬂy discuss the political
economy of merit aid. Why has it arisen where it has and when it has? What
are the prospects for its continuation and growth, given the current, poor
ﬁscal prospects of the states?
2.2 State Merit Aid: A Primer
Broad-based state merit aid became common in a very short span of
time. In 1993, just two states, Arkansas and Georgia, had programs in
place. By 2002, thirteen states had introduced large merit aid programs.
Most of this growth has occurred quite recently, with seven programs start-
ing up since 1999. As is clear from the map in ﬁgure 2.1, merit aid is heav-
ily concentrated in the southern region of the United States. Of the thirteen
states with broad-based merit aid programs, nine are in the South. Table
2.1 summarizes the characteristics of the thirteen broad-based merit pro-
grams. As was discussed earlier, dozens of states have some form of merit
aid in place. The state programs detailed in table 2.1 were chosen because
they have particularly lenient eligibility criteria, with at least 30 percent of
high school students having grades and test scores high enough to qualify
for a scholarship.5
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4. Two-year colleges are generally cheaper than four-year colleges. Most merit aid pro-
grams make them both free.
5. The eligibility estimates are based on national data from the NLSY97. Many of the states
listed in table 2.1 do not have enough observations in the NLSY97 to allow state-speciﬁc esti-
mates of the share of students whose GPA qualiﬁes them for their state’s merit program. For all
states, therefore, I use the national grade distribution to impute the share in a state that meets
the eligibility criteria. When available, state-level data on the ACT and SAT are used to mea-
sure the share of students who meet these criteria. Note that these estimates are used only to
choose the merit programs to be analyzed; they are not used in the paper’s regression analyses.For example, the Arkansas award requires a GPA of 2.5, a standard met
by 60 percent of high school students nationwide. The state also requires a
minimum on the American College Test (ACT) of 19, a score exceeded by
60 percent of test takers nationwide and well below the Arkansas state av-
erage of 20.4. Five other states, like Arkansas, condition eligibility on a
minimum GPA and test score. Six states use only GPA to determine eligi-
bility. Of the states that require a minimum GPA, four require a GPA of 3.0,
while two make awards to those with a GPA of 2.5.
Only one state—Michigan—bases eligibility solely on standardized test
performance. For the class of 2000, 31 percent of Michigan students had
test scores suﬃciently high to merit an award. However, this overall eligi-
bility rate masks substantial heterogeneity: Just 7.9 percent of African
American students met the Michigan requirement. Civil rights groups
have protested that this wide gap in eligibility indicates that Michigan’s
achievement test is an inappropriate instrument with which to determine
66 Susan Dynarski

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.eligibility for a state-funded scholarship. Similar objections were raised in
Arkansas, which initially based eligibility for its program only on perfor-
mance on standardized tests but later broadened the criteria to include
academic performance in high school.
These controversies point to a shared characteristic of merit programs:
their scholarships ﬂow disproportionately to white, non-Hispanic, upper-
income students. One reason is that blacks, Hispanics, and low-income
youths are relatively unlikely to attend college, so any subsidy to college
students will ﬂow disproportionately to white, upper-income youth. But
even among those nonwhite, Hispanic, and low-income youths who do at-
tend college, academic performance is a barrier to merit aid eligibility.
For merit programs that are based on standardized tests, it is unsurpris-
ing to see (as in Michigan) a large gap in the eligibility rates of whites and
African Americans, as the correlation between standardized test perfor-
mance and race is well documented. However, even those programs with
only a GPA cutoﬀwill experience large racial diﬀerences in eligibility, since
academic performance in the classroom varies considerably by race and
ethnicity. Forty percent of high school seniors have a 3.0 GPA or higher,
while only 15 percent of African Americans and Hispanics meet this stan-
dard. Further, blacks and Hispanics receive relatively low grades in college,
which threatens their ability to keep any merit scholarship they are able to
win with their high school grades.
Since nonwhite youths are less likely to qualify, it is plausible that merit
aid programs will have little positive impact upon their college attendance.
Further, if the new merit aid crowds out state spending on need-based aid
or leads to higher tuition prices, the programs may actually decrease low-
income, nonwhite college attendance, since these populations will face the
resulting cost increases but will be disproportionately ineligible for the new
merit scholarships. Merit aid would therefore tend to widen existing gaps
in college attendance, as it ﬂows to those who already attend college at the
highest rates. A countervailing force is that blacks and Hispanics may be
relatively sensitive to college costs. Among those blacks and Hispanics who
are eligible, a merit program could have a relatively large impact on school-
ing decisions. It is therefore an empirical question, to be investigated by
this chapter, whether merit programs narrow or widen existing racial and
ethnic gaps in postsecondary schooling.
2.3 Case Study: The Georgia HOPE Scholarship
In 1991, Georgia Governor Zell Miller requested that the state’s General
Assembly consider the establishment of a state-run lottery, with the pro-
ceeds to be devoted to education. The Georgia General Assembly passed
lottery-enabling legislation during its 1992 session and forwarded the issue
to voters, who approved the required amendment to the state’s constitution
68 Susan Dynarskiin November of 1992. The ﬁrst lottery tickets were sold in June of 1993.
$2.5 billion in lottery revenue has ﬂowed into Georgia’s educational insti-
tutions since 1993. The legislation and amendment enabling the lottery
speciﬁed that the new funds were not to crowd out spending from tradi-
tional sources. While it is not possible to establish conclusively that such
crowdout has not occurred, spending on education has risen substantially
since the lottery was initiated, both in absolute dollars and as a share of to-
tal state spending. Roughly equal shares of lottery funds have gone to four
programs: the HOPE Scholarship, educational technology for primary
and secondary schools, a new pre-kindergarten program, and school con-
struction.
Residents who have graduated since 1993 from Georgia high schools
with at least a 3.0 GPA are eligible for HOPE.6Public college students must
maintain a GPA of 3.0 to keep the scholarship; a similar requirement was
introduced for private school students in 1996. The HOPE Scholarship
pays for tuition and required fees at Georgia’s public colleges and univer-
sities. Those attending private colleges are eligible for an annual grant,
which was $500 in 1993 and had increased to $3,000 by 1996. A $500 edu-
cation voucher is available to those who complete a General Education
Diploma (GED). The ﬁrst scholarships were disbursed in the fall of 1993.
Participation in HOPE during its ﬁrst year was limited to those with fam-
ily incomes below $66,000; the income cap was raised to $100,000 in 1994
and eliminated in 1995.
Two administrative aspects of HOPE diﬀerentially aﬀected low- and
upper-income youths. Since income is highly correlated with race and eth-
nicity, these administrative quirks may explain any racial and ethnic het-
erogeneity we observe in HOPE’s eﬀect. First, until 2001, HOPE awards
were oﬀset by other sources of aid. A student who received the maximum
Pell Grant got no HOPE Scholarship except for a yearly book allowance
of $400.7 Insofar as blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately repre-
sented in the ranks of those who receive need-based aid, their HOPE
awards would have been reduced more frequently than those of their white,
non-Hispanic peers. Second, also until 2001, students from families with
low incomes faced a more arduous application process for HOPE than did
other students. Georgia education oﬃcials, concerned that students would
forgo applying for federal aid once the HOPE Scholarship was available,
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6. The high school GPA requirement is waived for those enrolled in certiﬁcate programs at
technical institutes. For high school seniors graduating after 2000, only courses in English,
math, social studies, science, and foreign languages count toward the GPA requirement.
7. As a result of this provision and the scaling back of the state’s need-based State Student
Incentive Grants (SSIGs), some low-income students have actually seen their state aid re-
duced since HOPE was introduced (Jaﬀe 1997). This contemporaneous shift in SSIG spend-
ing has the potential to contaminate the paper’s estimates. However, SSIG spending was so
miniscule—$5.2 million in 1995, before the program was scaled back—that the impact of its
elimination on the estimates is likely to be inconsequential.mandated that applicants from families with incomes lower than $50,000
complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The ra-
tionale for the $50,000 income threshold was that few students above that
cutoﬀ were  eligible for need-based, federal grant aid.8 The four-page
FAFSA requests detailed income, expense, asset, and tax data from the
family. By contrast, those with family incomes above $50,000 ﬁlled out a
simple, one-page form that required no information about ﬁnances other
than a conﬁrmation that family income was indeed above the cutoﬀ. As a
consequence of the two provisions just discussed, low-income students
faced higher transaction costs and lower average scholarships than did up-
per-income students.
In 2000–2001, 75,000 students received $277 million in HOPE Scholar-
ships. Georgia politicians have deemed HOPE a great success, pointing to
the steady rise in the number of college students receiving HOPE. The key
question is whether the program actually changes schooling decisions or
simply subsidizes inframarginal students. In the next section, I discuss the
data and empirical strategy I will use to answer this question.
2.4 Data
Any empirical analysis of state ﬁnancial aid policy quickly comes face to
face with frustrating data limitations. The data requirements appear mi-
nor, since eligibility for merit aid is determined by a very short list of char-
acteristics: state of residence at the time of high school graduation, high
school GPA, standardized test score, and, in some states, parental income.
In order to use this information in an evaluation of the eﬀect of merit aid,
we would want these characteristics for repeated cohorts of high school
students, both before and after merit aid is introduced in their state, so that
schooling decisions of eligible and ineligible cohorts could be compared.9
Finally, we need a data set with state-level samples large enough to allow
for informative analysis.
No publicly available data set meets all of these requirements. Surveys
that are limited to college students do not, by their nature, allow us to ex-
amine the college attendance margin. For example, the National Postsec-
ondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) surveys college students about their
aid packages and contains detailed information from students’ aid appli-
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8. In 1995, only 3.7 percent of dependent students from families with incomes over $40,000
received federal grant aid, while 57 percent of those from families with income under $20,000
did so (National Center for Education Statistics 1998a).
9. Alternatively, we could make use of the sharp discontinuities in the eligibility require-
ments to estimate the eﬀect of merit aid from a single cohort. Kane (2003) uses this approach
in an evaluation of California’s CalGrant program, comparing the college attendance of those
very slightly above and very slightly below the grade point cutoﬀ. This approach requires very
large samples; Kane uses an administrative data set that is a near-census of potential college
entrants.cations. By design, this data set cannot inform us about those students who
decided not to go to college. Without making strong assumptions about
how those who do not go to college diﬀer from those who do, we cannot
use the NPSAS to examine how aid aﬀects the college attendance rate.
The NPSAS can be used to answer other questions of interest, however.
For example, we might be interested in whether merit aid leads to higher
tuition prices, or more or less government spending on other forms of aid.
Or we might be interested in how the racial composition of a state’s schools
changes, if at all, after the introduction of a merit aid program. The
NPSAS, as well as data that institutions gather about their students and re-
port to the government through the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS), can answer questions of this type.10
The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSs) of Youth of 1979 and 1997
are particularly rich sources of data, containing information about aca-
demic performance on standardized tests, grades, parental income, and
schooling decisions.11 In a few years, the NLSY97 will be a useful resource
for evaluating the newer merit aid programs, in particular those introduced
in the late 1990s. The only weakness of the NLSY97 is that it is unlikely to
interview enough youths in any one state to allow for detailed examination
of a single merit aid program. Observations from multiple merit states
could be pooled, however, as is done with the Current Population Survey
in this paper.
Another potentially fruitful option for research in this area is data from
administrative sources. Kane (2003) and Henry and Rubinstein (2002) take
this approach in evaluations of programs in California and Georgia, re-
spectively.12 Kane matches enrollment data from California’s public uni-
versities and colleges to federal aid applications and high school tran-
scripts. He then uses regression-discontinuity methodology to estimate the
eﬀect of California’s merit program on schooling decisions. Henry and Ru-
binstein use data from the College Board on high school grades and SAT
scores in order to examine whether the Georgia HOPE Scholarship has led
to grade inﬂation in high schools.
2.4.1 The Current Population Survey and the Analysis of State Aid Policy
The bulk of the analysis in this paper is based on a publicly available sur-
vey data set, the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a national
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10. Papers that use college-based surveys in this way include Long (2002) and Cornwell,
Mustard, and Sridhar (2003), both of which evaluate the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.
11. The U.S. Department of Education’s longitudinal surveys of the high school cohorts of
1972, 1982, and 1992 contain similarly rich data. But because each survey contains a single
cohort, we cannot use these data to observe schooling decisions in a given state both before
and after merit aid is introduced.
12. California’s program is not among the programs discussed in this chapter, as it is rela-
tively narrow in its scope due to income provisions that exclude many middle- and upper-
income youth.household survey that each October gathers detailed information about
schooling enrollment. Data on type of school attended, as well as basic de-
mographics such as age, race, and ethnicity, are included in the CPS. While
the CPS is the world’s premier labor force survey, from the perspective of
this chapter it has some key limitations.
First, the CPS lacks information about academic performance. We
therefore cannot narrow the analysis to those whose academic perfor-
mance makes them eligible for merit aid, and thereby measure the eﬀect on
schooling decisions of oﬀering a merit scholarship among those who qual-
ify (an eﬀect I will denote  ). From a policy perspective, the question we
cananswer is quite relevant: How does the existence of a merit aid program
aﬀect the schooling decisions of a state’s youths? To answer this question,
I will estimate a program eﬀect (denoted  ) that is the product of two in-
teresting parameters: (1)  , the behavioral response to the oﬀer of aid of
youths eligible for the scholarship and (2)  , the share of youths eligible for
the scholarship:13
     
When considering the eﬀect of a ﬁnancial aid program such as the Pell
Grant, we generally are interested only in  . We assume that the parame-
ters that determine Pell eligibility, such as family size and income, cannot
easily be manipulated by those eager to obtain the grant. By contrast, merit
aid is a program that intendsto induce behavior that will increase the share
that is aid-eligible. Policymakers consistently cite their desire to give stu-
dents a ﬁnancial incentive to work hard in high school and college as their
motivation for establishing merit aid programs. Estimating   while ignor-
ing   would therefore miss half the story. Fortunately, data constraints pre-
vent us from making this mistake!
A more serious weakness of the CPS is that it provides family back-
ground data for only a subset of youths. Highly relevant variables such as
parental income, parental education, and other measures of socioeconomic
status are available only for those youths who live with their families or who
are temporarily away at college.14 The probability that a youth has family
background information available is therefore a function of his or her
propensity to attend college. Under these circumstances, we cannot limit
the analysis to those who have family background data without inducing
bias in analyses in which college attendance is an outcome of interest.15 In
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13. This formulation ignores any heterogeneity in  , the eﬀect of the oﬀer of aid on those
who are eligible. It is almost certain that this eﬀect is not homogeneous. For example, the oﬀer
of aid will probably have a diﬀerent eﬀect on those whose grades place them just on the mar-
gin of eligibility and those whose grades are so strong that they are well within this margin.
14. These youths appear on their parents’ CPS record and so can be linked to parental data.
Other youths will show up in the CPS as members of their own households.
15. Cameron and Heckman (1999) discuss this point.the analysis, therefore, I will make use only of background variables that are
available for all youths.
2.4.2 Is State of Residence of Youth Systematically
Mismeasured in the CPS?
A ﬁnal weakness of the CPS is that it explicitly identiﬁes neither the state
in which a person attended high school nor the state in which he or she at-
tends college. In this paper, I proxy for the state in which a person attended
high school with current state of residence. This is a reasonable proxy, for
two reasons. First, among eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds, the group stud-
ied in this chapter, migration across state lines for reasons other than col-
lege is minimal. Second, when youths do go out of state to college, accord-
ing to CPS coding standards they are recorded as residents of the state of
origin, rather than the state in which they attend college.
The key question is whether these standards are followed in practice. We
are conﬁdent that this protocol has been followed for those youths (78 per-
cent of the sample) who appear on their parents’ record.16 Whether the
CPS correctly captures the state of residence for the other 22 percent is an
important question, as error in the collection of these data will bias the
chapter’s estimates.
If state of residence is simply a noisy measure of state of origin for this
22 percent, then the paper’s estimates will be biased toward zero. But con-
sider the following scenario, in which we will be biased toward ﬁnding a
positiveeﬀect of merit aid on the probability of college attendance. Say that
HOPE has no eﬀect on the college entry margin but does aﬀect whether
students go to college in state. If the CPS incorrectly codes the state of res-
idence as the state in which one is attending college, then any drop in the
outward migration of Georgia college students induced by HOPE will me-
chanically induce an increase in the observed share of Georgia youths at-
tending college.
A few simple tabulations can give us a sense of whether this is a problem.
If the scenario laid out in the previous paragraph holds, then we should
observe relative growth in the size of the college-age population in Georgia
after HOPE is introduced. To test this hypothesis, I predicted the size of
Georgia’s college-age population by aging forward the high school–age pop-
ulation. Speciﬁcally, I compared the population of eighteen-to-nineteen-
year-olds in a given state to the population of sixteen-to-seventeen-year-
olds in the same state two years earlier. This is an admittedly crude
prediction of cohort size. It will be wrong for any number of reasons, among
them immigration and incarceration of teenagers (prisons are not in the
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16. We cannot restrict the analytical sample to this subset because, as discussed earlier,
whether a youth is on his or her parents’ record is correlated with whether he or she is in col-
lege.CPS sampling frame). However, the relevant issue is not how error-ridden
this prediction is, but whether the sign and magnitude of its error change sys-
tematicallywhen a merit program is introduced in a state. In particular, does
the population of college-age youths expand unexpectedly when a state in-
troduces a merit program?
Figure 2.2 plots the diﬀerence between the predicted and actual cohort
sizes, with the diﬀerence normed by the predicted size. I plot the normed
error for Georgia and the average normed error for the other states in the
Southeast and the United States.17 For measurement error to be inducing
positive bias in the paper’s estimates, the errors should grow relatively more
negative in Georgia after HOPE is introduced. There is no such clear trend.
The large negative errors in Georgia in 1993 through 1995 are somewhat
disturbing, even though a muted version of this pattern also appears in the
U.S. and Southeastern series. In ﬁgure 2.3, I show the same series for West
Virginia, a southern state that had no merit program during this period.
This state’s pattern is almost identical to that of Georgia, suggesting that
Georgia’s shifts in cohort size are random noise and that the paper’s esti-
mates will not be contaminated by this source of bias.
2.5 Georgia HOPE Analysis
I begin by examining how the college attendance rate has changed in
Georgia since HOPE was introduced, compared to how it has evolved in
the other Southern states that have not introduced merit programs. The
outcome of interest is whether an eighteen-to-nineteen-year-old is cur-
rently enrolled in college. I start with a parsimonious speciﬁcation, in
which an indicator variable for being enrolled in college is regressed against
a set of state, year, and age eﬀects, along with a variable, HOPE, that is set
to 1 in survey years 1993 through 2000 for those who are from Georgia. In
this equation, the HOPE variable therefore indicates that a young person
of college age resides in Georgia after HOPE is in operation.
The estimating equation is as follows:
(1) yiast    0    1HOPEst    s    t    a   εiast,
where yiastis an indicator of whether person iof age aliving in state sin year
t is enrolled in college;  s,  t, and  a denote state, year, and age ﬁxed eﬀects,
respectively; and εiast is an idiosyncratic error term. I use ordinary least
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17. That is, I calculate the prediction error for each state-year and divide it by the predicted
value for that state-year. I take the average of these normed, state-year errors separately for
the Southeastern United States and the entire United States, in both cases excluding Georgia.
Each state-year is treated as a single observation; I have not weighted by population.
The Georgia series is substantially more volatile than those of the Southeast and United
States; however, any state’s error will look volatile compared to averages for the region and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































.squares (OLS) to estimate this equation, correcting standard errors for het-
eroskedasticity and correlation of the error terms within state cells.
Recall that HOPE (1) decreases the price of college, (2) decreases the
price of in-state colleges relative to out-of-state colleges, and (3) decreases
the price of four-year colleges relative to two-year colleges. The corre-
sponding predicted behaviors for Georgia residents are (1) increased prob-
ability of college attendance, (2) increased probability of in-state atten-
dance relative to out-of-state attendance, and (3) increased probability of
four-year attendance relative to two-year attendance.
Column (1) of table 2.2 shows the college attendance results. The esti-
mates indicate that the college attendance rate in Georgia rose 8.6 per-
centage points relative to that in the other Southern, nonmerit states after
HOPE was introduced. The estimate is highly signiﬁcant, with a standard
error of 0.8 percentage points. This estimate is quite close to the estimate
in Dynarski (2000), which was based on CPS data for 1989 through 1997.18
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Fig. 2.3 Does measurement error in state of residence bias the estimates?
Note: The ﬁgure plots the diﬀerence between the predicted and actual population of college-
age youth, with the diﬀerence normed by the predicted population. The predicted population
of eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in a state is the number of sixteen-to-seventeen-year-olds in
that state two years earlier. The data used are the October Current Population Surveys.
18. The standard error is substantially smaller, however, than that in Dynarski (2000),
which conservatively corrected standard errors for correlation at the state-year level. Ber-
trand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2002) conclude that, in this type of application, the appro-
priate correction is for correlation at the state level.The result suggests that HOPE did, as predicted, increase the share of
youths attending college.
I next probe the robustness of this result by adding a set of covariates to
this regression. For reasons discussed earlier, I limit myself to covariates
that are available for the entire sample and exclude any that require that a
youth and his or her parents appear on the same survey record, such as
parental education and income. Control variables indicate whether a youth
lives in a metropolitan area, is African American, or is Hispanic. These
three variables are each interacted with a full set of year eﬀects, so that the
eﬀect of these attributes on schooling decisions is allowed to vary ﬂexibly
over time. I also include the state’s unemployment rate and the median in-
come of families with children who are near college age. These two vari-
ables are intended to capture any Georgia-speciﬁc economic shocks that
may have aﬀected college attendance decisions. Results are in column (2).
The coeﬃcient does not change, although the standard error increases to
1.3 percentage points.
I next examine whether the eﬀect of merit aid extends across state bor-
ders. Since students travel across state lines for college, changes in postsec-
ondary education policy in one state will reverberate in neighboring states.
If more Georgians want to go to college, and the supply of colleges is in-
elastic, students from Florida, for example, will be pushed out of school
when HOPE is introduced. The estimating equation is as follows:
(2) yiast    0    1HOPEst    2border_meritst    3Xst    4Xi    s    t
   a   εiast
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Table 2.2 Estimated Eﬀect of Georgia HOPE Scholarship on College Attendance
of Eighteen-to-Nineteen-Year-Olds (Southern Census region)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HOPE Scholarship .086 .085 .085 .069
(.008) (.013) (.013) (.019)
Merit program in border state –.005 –.006
(.013) (.013)
State and year eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Median family income Y Y Y
Unemployment rate Y Y Y
Interactions of year eﬀects with 
black, metro, Hispanic Y Y Y
Time trends Y
R2 .020 .059 .059 .056
No. of observations 8,999 8,999 8,999 8,999
Notes:Regressions are weighted by CPS sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation within state cells. Sample consists of eighteen-
to-nineteen-year-olds in Southern Census region, excluding states (other than Georgia) that
introduce merit programs by 2000. See table 2.1 for a list of these states. 2 captures the eﬀect of having a merit program in a neighboring state. Xst
and Xi are the state-year and individual covariates discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph and used in column (2). Results are in column (3). The re-
sults weakly suggest that having a merit program on one’s border has a
small, negative eﬀect on college attendance, indicating the presence of
supply constraints. The point estimate is fairly imprecise, however: –0.5
percentage points, with a standard error of 1.3 percentage points.19
An identifying assumption of the preceding analysis is that Georgia and
the control states were on similar trends in their college attendance rates
before HOPE was introduced. If they were instead on divergent trends the
estimates will be biased. In particular, if attendance was rising in Georgia
relative to the other states before 1993, then we will falsely attribute to
HOPE the continuation of this trend. The inclusion of these preexisting
trends in the equation will eliminate this source of bias. In column (4), I add
to the regression separate time trends for Georgia and the nonmerit
states.20 The point estimate drops moderately, to 6.9 percentage points, in-
dicating that Georgia was trending away from the rest of the South before
HOPE. However, there is still a substantial relative increase in attendance
in Georgia that cannot be explained by this trend.
2.5.1 The Eﬀect of HOPE on School Choice
I next examine whether HOPE has aﬀected decisions other than college
entry. In particular, I examine the type of college that a student chooses to
attend. The October CPS contains information about whether a student
attends a public or private college and whether it is a two- or four-year in-
stitution. I use this information to construct four variables that indicate
whether a person attends a two-year private school, a two-year public
school, a four-year private school, or a four-year public school. I then run
a series of four regressions in which these are the outcomes, including the
same covariates as in the richest speciﬁcation of table 2.2. I show results
that both do and do not include time trends. The results are shown in table
2.3. The attendance results of the previous table are included for ease of
comparison.
The HOPE Scholarship appears to increase the probability of atten-
dance at four-year public institutions substantially, by 4.5 percentage
points (no time trends) to 8.4 percentage points (time trends included). At-
tendance at four-year private schools also rises, although the estimates are
smaller than those (2.2 to 2.8 percentage points). There is a somewhat
smaller rise in the probability of attendance at two-year private schools
(about 1.5 percentage points) and a drop at two-year public schools (of 1.7
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19. I have also tested the inclusion of the interaction of having a merit program in one’s own
state and having a merit program in a neighboring state. The interaction is never large or sig-
niﬁcant, and its inclusion does not aﬀect the paper’s estimates.
20. The time trends are estimated using pre-1993 data.to 5.5 percentage points). All but two of the eight estimates are signiﬁcant
at conventional levels.
These shifts in schooling decisions are in the expected direction. Any
subsidy to college will both pull students into two-year public schools
(from not going to college at all) and push them out of two-year public
schools (into four-year colleges). The HOPE Scholarship appears to push
more students out of two-year, public institutions than it pulls in, produc-
ing a net drop at these schools. Most of these students appear to shift to-
ward four-year public institutions, although some also shift into the private
sector.21
2.5.2 The Eﬀect of HOPE on Migration to College
We might expect that HOPE would also aﬀect whether students choose
to attend college in their home state. Data from both the University System
of Georgia (USG) and the Department of Education’s Residence and Mi-
gration Survey suggest that HOPE has had the eﬀect of encouraging Geor-
gia residents who would have attended a four-year college out of state to
stay in Georgia instead. Data from the Residence and Migration Survey in-
dicate that in 1992 about 5,000 Georgians were freshmen at two- and four-
year colleges in the states that border Georgia. This represented an average
of 3.4 percent of the border states’ freshman enrollment. By 1998, just 4,500
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Table 2.3 Eﬀect of Georgia HOPE Scholarship on Schooling Decisions (October CPS,
1988–2000; Southern Census region)
College 2-Year 2-Year 4-Year 4-Year
Attendance Public Private Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No time trends
Hope Scholarship .085 –.018 .015 .045 .022
(.013) (.010) (.002) (.015) (.007)
R2 .059 .026 .010 .039 .026
Add time trends
Hope Scholarship .069 –.055 .014 .084 .028
(.019) (.013) (.004) (.023) (.016)
R2 .056 .026 .010 .029 .026
Mean of dependent variable .407 .122 .008 .212 .061
Notes: Speciﬁcation in “No time trends” is that of column (3) in table 2.2. Speciﬁcation in “Add time
trends” adds trends estimated on pretreatment data. In each column, two separate trends are included,
one for Georgia and one for the rest of the states. Sample consists of eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in
Southern Census region, excluding states (other than Georgia) that introduce a merit program by 2000.
No. of observations   8,999. Standard errors in parentheses.
21. Note that the coeﬃcients for the four schooling options do not sum to the overall at-
tendance eﬀect. This is because the type of school is unknown for some students, who appear
as college attenders but not as attending a speciﬁc type of school.Georgians crossed state lines to enter college in the border states, account-
ing for an average of 2.9 percent of freshman enrollment in those states. This
drop in migration was concentrated in a group of border schools that have
traditionally drawn large numbers of Georgians. At the ten border schools
drawing the most Georgia freshmen in 1992, students from Georgia num-
bered 1,900 and averaged 17 percent of the freshman class. By 1998, the ten
top destinations enrolled 1,700 Georgians, who represented 9 percent of
freshman enrollment. Jacksonville State College in Florida, for example,
drew 189 Georgian freshmen in 1992 and only 89 in 1998; the share of the
freshman class from Georgia dropped from 17 to 11 percent.
Further supporting the conclusion that Georgia’s four-year college stu-
dents are now more likely to attend college in state is a shift in the compo-
sition of Georgia’s four-year colleges. Figure 2.4shows data from the USG
on the share of freshman enrollees that are Georgia residents at Georgia’s
two- and four-year public colleges. The data are separately plotted for the
two-year, four-year, and elite four-year colleges in the state. Here we see a
deﬁnite shift toward Georgia residents since HOPE was introduced, with
the eﬀect most pronounced at four-year colleges (especially the top
schools) and least evident at the two-year schools. This pattern ﬁts with our
understanding that four-year students are most mobile when making col-
lege attendance decisions.
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Fig. 2.4 University System of Georgia students, Georgia residents as share of
total enrollment2.5.3 The Diﬀerential Impact of HOPE by Race and Ethnicity
The eﬀect of merit programs may vary across racial and ethnic groups
for a number of reasons. First, as was discussed earlier, academic perfor-
mance in high school is strongly correlated with race and ethnicity. Second,
the rules of the programs are sometimes such that they are likely to have a
lesser impact on low-income youths. Until recently, Georgia did not oﬀer
the grant to those youths who had substantial Pell Grants and low college
costs. Mechanically, then, the program would have had a lower impact on
African Americans and Hispanics, who tend to have lower incomes: in
Georgia, 94 percent of African American but just 62 percent of white
sixteen-to-seventeen-year-olds live in families with incomes less than
$50,000.22 The numbers for the rest of the United States are similar.23
Third, states that have merit programs may reduce need-based aid or ap-
propriations to colleges. Both of these eﬀects would tend to make college
more expensive for those who don’t qualify for the merit programs to which
the money is being channeled. Finally, the elasticity of schooling with re-
spect to a given grant may diﬀer across demographic groups. A priori, it is
not clear whether blacks and Hispanics would be more or less elastic than
other students in their schooling decisions.24
To explore how the eﬀect of merit aid programs varies by race and eth-
nicity, I repeat the analysis of the preceding section but allow the eﬀect of
HOPE to diﬀer across racial and ethnic groups. I divide the population
into two mutually exclusive categories: (1) white non-Hispanics and (2)
Hispanics of any race plus blacks.25 I then estimate the eﬀect of merit aid
separately for each group. The estimating equation is
(3) yiast    0    1Meritst    2Meritst   black_hispi    3border_Meritst
   4Xst    5Xi    s    t    a   εiast.
Results for Georgia are in table 2.4, for speciﬁcations that do and do not
include preexisting time trends.26 The point estimates are somewhat un-
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22. Author’s estimates from the CPS. Note that this refers to the nominal income distribu-
tion. This is appropriate, since the Georgia rules were written in nominal rather than real
terms.
23. These ﬁgures for the share with income below $50,000 may appear high. This is because
the unit of observation is not the family but the child. Since lower-income families have more
children, the distribution of family income within a sample of children has a lower mean and
median than the distribution of family income within a sample of families.
24. Dynarski (2000) develops a model of schooling choice that demonstrates this ambigu-
ity. Dynarski (2002) reviews the evidence on the relative price elasticities of the schooling of
low- and upper-income youths.
25. I would prefer to separately examine eﬀects on blacks and Hispanics. I have attempted
to do so, but the Hispanic results are too imprecisely estimated to be informative.
26. When time trends are included, they are estimated separately by state and race/ethnic-
ity. Trends are estimated for four separate groups: (1) non-Hispanic whites in Georgia; (2)
non-Hispanic whites in the rest of the Southern nonmerit states; (3) blacks and Hispanics in
Georgia; and (4) blacks and Hispanics in the rest of the nonmerit Southern states.stable, changing substantially when time trends are included. But the two
sets of estimates agree that HOPE had a substantially greater eﬀect on
white attendance than black and Hispanic attendance. The estimated eﬀect
of HOPE on the white attendance rate is 9.6 to 14.0 percentage points,
while that on blacks and Hispanics is –0.7 to 6.6 percentage points. The re-
sults indicate that HOPE has increased racial and ethnic gaps in college at-
tendance in Georgia.
2.6 The Eﬀect of Broad-Based Merit Aid in Other States
The Georgia program was one of the ﬁrst, largest, and best-publicized
merit aid programs. It has also been, by far, the best-studied program; at
this point, dozens of papers have analyzed its impact. In the absence of
sound empirical research on the eﬀect of the other merit programs, the
Georgia experience has been extrapolated in predicting their eﬀects.27
However, as is shown in table 2.1, there is heterogeneity in program rules,
which may well lead to heterogeneity in the programs’ eﬀects. Further, ini-
tial college attendance rates and the supply of postsecondary schools vary
across the merit aid states, which may aﬀect the impact of the merit pro-
grams on schooling decisions. For all these reasons, results from one state
may not provide a good prediction of the eﬀect of another state’s merit pro-
gram.
Fortunately, many of the merit aid programs in table 2.1 have now been
in existence suﬃciently long to allow us to separately estimate program
eﬀects for each state. I will limit my analysis to the South, where all but
three of the programs in table 2.1 are located. A beneﬁt of focusing on the
Southern merit states is that they have a natural control group: the non-
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Table 2.4 Eﬀect of Georgia HOPE Scholarship on College Attendance Analysis by
Race and Ethnicity (October CPS, 1988–2000; Southern Census region)
No Time Trends Time Trends
Merit Program .096 .140
(.014) (.013)
Merit   black/Hispanic –.030 –.147
(.023) (.039)
R2 .059 .056
Notes: Speciﬁcation in ﬁrst column is that of column (3) in table 2.2. Speciﬁcation in second
column adds trends estimated on pretreatment data. Separate trends are included for four
groups: white-control, white-treat, nonwhite-control and nonwhite-treat. Sample consists of
eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in Southern Census region, excluding states other than Geor-
gia that introduce a merit program by 2000. Standard errors in parentheses.
27. An exception is the study by Binder and Ganderton (2002), which examined the eﬀect
of New Mexico’s merit program. They conclude that New Mexico Success has not aﬀected
the college attendance rate but, like HOPE, has shifted students toward four-year schools.merit Southern states. The programs of three Southern states (Maryland,
Tennessee, and West Virginia) are excluded, as they were introduced after
2000, the last year of the sample. That leaves seven merit programs, located
in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina.
I follow the approach used in the analysis of HOPE, creating a variable
that indicates a year and state in which a merit program is in place. I esti-
mate the following equation:
(4) yiast    0    1meritst    2border_meritst    3Xst    4Xi    s    t
   a   εiast
Results are in table 2.5. The estimated overall eﬀect of the seven merit pro-
grams is 4.7 percentage points. The estimate is highly signiﬁcant, with a
The New Merit Aid 83
Table 2.5 Eﬀect of All Southern Merit Programs on College Attendance of
Eighteen-to-Nineteen-Year-Olds
All Southern States  Southern Merit States 
(N   13,965) Only (N   5,640)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Merit program .047 .052
(.011) (.018)
Merit program, Arkansas .048 .016
(.015) (.014)
Merit program, Florida .030 .063
(.014) (.031)
Merit program, Georgia .074 .068
(.010) (.014)
Merit program, Kentucky .073 .063
(.025) (.047)
Merit program, Louisiana .060 .058
(.012) (.022)
Merit program, Mississippi .049 .022
(.014) (.018)
Merit program, South Carolina .044 .014
(.013) (.023)
Merit program, year 1 .024 .051
(.019) (.027)
Merit program, year 2 .010 .043
(.032) (.024)
Merit program, year 3 and after .060 .098
(.030) (.039)
State time trends Y Y
R2 .046 .046 .047 .035 .036 .036
Notes: Speciﬁcation is that of column (3) in table 2.2, with the addition of state time trends
where noted. Sample consists of eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in Southern Census region,
with the last three columns excluding states that have not introduced a merit program by 2000.
Standard errors in parentheses.standard error of 1.1 percentage points. In column (2), I allow this aﬀect to
vary across the seven states, by replacing the single merit dummy with a set
of seven dummies, one for each state’s program. The speciﬁcation of col-
umn (2) is otherwise identical to that of column (1), and so the appropri-
ately weighted average of the seven coeﬃcients is the 4.7 percentage points
of column (1). Six of the estimates are highly signiﬁcant. Five are clustered
between 4.9 (Mississippi) and 7.4 (Georgia). Well below Mississippi are
Florida and South Carolina, with estimated eﬀects of 3.0 and 0.2 percent-
age points, respectively.
We might suspect that the merit states are somehow diﬀerent from the
nonmerit states and that the nonmerit states therefore form a poor control
group for these purposes. We can test the sensitivity of our results to the
choice of control group by dropping the nonmerit states from the sample
and estimating the eﬀect of merit aid purely from the staggered timing of
its rollout across the states. In this approach, the merit states form their
own control group. Figure 2.5 graphically illustrates the identiﬁcation
strategy. During the ﬁrst years of the sample (1988–1990), before the ﬁrst
merit program is introduced, all of the states are in the control group. In
1991, Arkansas moves into the treatment group, followed in 1993 by Geor-
gia. By 2000, all of the states are in the treatment group. This approach as-
sumes that the states that eventually have a merit program are on similar
trends in the schooling outcomes of young people. The assumption is that
the year in which a state’s merit program begins is quasi-random, uncorre-
lated with any state-speciﬁc trends in or shocks to schooling decisions.
Results are in columns (4) and (5) of table 2.5. The estimated overall
eﬀect is insensitive to the choice of control group, with the estimate rising
only slightly from 4.7 to 5.2 percentage points. The state-speciﬁc coeﬃ-
cients are somewhat more sensitive to the choice of control group. For ﬁve
of the states, the two approaches yield similar results. The two exceptions
are Arkansas and Florida, for whom the estimates vary substantially be-
tween column (2) and column (4). Arkansas’s estimate drops from 4.8 to
1.6, while Florida’s rises from 3.0 to 6.3.
Only South Carolina has a consistently small and insigniﬁcant eﬀect,
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Fig. 2.5 Timing of introduction of state merit programswhich may be explained by its requirement that students score at least 24
on the ACT. Nationally, just 30 percent of test takers scored above South
Carolina’s ACT cutoﬀ in 2000, while 88 percent met Missouri’s require-
ment and about 60 percent met the requirements of Arkansas (19), Florida
(20), and Louisiana (19.6).28 The South Carolina legislature has come un-
der pressure to loosen the scholarship requirements and has responded by
adding another route to eligibility. As of 2002, students can qualify for a
scholarship by meeting two of three criteria: 24 on the ACT, a GPA of 3.0,
and graduating in the top 30 percent of one’s high school class (Bichevia
Green of the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education, personal
communication, June 14, 2002). Further, the ACT requirement has been
dropped completely for those attending two-year institutions. It will be of
interest to see if the eﬀect of South Carolina’s program on college atten-
dance rises with this shift in policy.
Next, I examine whether the inclusion of preexisting time trends aﬀects
the results. Preexisting trends could contaminate the results for both con-
trol groups. The merit states may be on diﬀerent time trends from the non-
merit states, and they may be on diﬀerent trends from each other. I estimate
a trend for the entire 1988–2000 period for each state. Deviations from
these trends after a state introduces merit aid are then attributed to the new
program.29
Results are in columns (3) and (6). As was true in the speciﬁcation with-
out time trends, the merit-only control group produces somewhat larger es-
timates. Both approaches indicate that the eﬀect of merit aid evolves over
time, with the eﬀect rising from 2.4 percentage points in the ﬁrst year a pro-
gram is in eﬀect to 6.0 percentage points in year three and beyond. When
the merit states are used as their own control group, the eﬀect rises from 5.1
percentage points in year one to 9.8 percentage points in the third year.
Note that these are not cumulative eﬀects but period-speciﬁc program
eﬀects.
The eﬀect of merit aid may rise during the ﬁrst years of a program for
several reasons. It may take time for information about the new programs
to diﬀuse. It also takes time for high school students who are inspired to
work harder to increase their overall GPAs. Those who are high school sen-
iors when a program is ﬁrst introduced can do little to increase their cu-
The New Merit Aid 85
28. These ﬁgures refer to the national ACT distribution, which has a mean of 21. The black
and Hispanic distributions have lower means, of 16.9 and 19, respectively. Fewer members of
these groups will meet the state ACT cutoﬀs.
29. In this speciﬁcation, a simple merit dummy will not properly identify the eﬀect of the
merit aid program, as such an approach would inappropriately attribute part of the aid-
induced change to the trend. We can solve this problem by replacing the merit dummy with
either a separate time trend or year eﬀects after merit aid is introduced in a state. Wolfers and
Stevenson (forthcoming) use this approach to estimate the eﬀect of divorce law reform, which
occurred in diﬀerent states in diﬀerent years.mulative GPAs, while those who are freshmen have four years to increase
their eﬀort. The pool of eligible youths may thereby expand over time.
The eﬀect could also diminish over time, if many college students fail to
qualify for scholarship renewals and their younger peers are discouraged
from taking up the scholarship. Further, in the presence of supply con-
straints, the eﬀect of latecomer programs would be smaller than that of ear-
lier programs, as attendance grows and the supply grows tighter. The re-
sults in table 2.5 indicate that, across the merit states, the incentive and
information eﬀects dominate the discouragement eﬀect.
2.6.1 The Eﬀect of Merit Aid on College Choice
The analysis of the previous section indicates that the state merit aid pro-
grams have increased college attendance. I next examine whether these
programs have also aﬀected the choice of college, as was true in Georgia. I
use the analytical framework of the previous section, although I will only
show results that pool the merit states in order to gain precision. All of the
Southern states are included in the sample; results are similar, but less pre-
cise, when the sample is limited to the Southern merit states. I show results
that do and do not include time trends.
Table 2.6 indicates that, overall, the Southern merit programs have had
a strong eﬀect on the choice of college, with a considerable shift toward
four-year public schools of 4.4 percentage points, which is about the same
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Table 2.6 Eﬀect of All Southern Merit Programs on Schooling Decisions of
Eighteen-to-Nineteen-Year-Olds (all Southern states; N   13,965)
College 2-Year 2-Year 4-Year 4-Year
Attendance Public Private Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No time trends
Merit program .047 –.010 .004 .044 .005
(.011) (.008) (.004) (.014) (.009)
R2 .046 .030 .007 .030 .020
State time trends
Merit program, year 1 .024 –.025 .009 .034 .010
(.019) (.012) (.005) (.012) (.007)
Merit program, year 2 .010 –.015 .002 .028 –.001
(.032) (.018) (.003) (.035) (.011)
Merit program, year 3  .060 –.037 .005 .065 .022
and after (.030) (.013) (.003) (.024) (.010)
R2 .047 .031 .009 .032 .022
Notes: Speciﬁcation is that of column (3) in table 2.2, with the addition of state time trends
where noted. Sample consists of eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in Southern Census region.
Estimates are similar but less precise when sample is limited to Southern merit states. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.as the overall attendance eﬀect. There are no eﬀects on other choices of col-
lege. As was discussed earlier, this is probably the result of equal-sized
shifts toward and away from two-year public schools, by students on the
margin of college entry and four-year-college attendance, respectively. The
time trend speciﬁcation gives similar results, although here there is more
indication of a net drop in the probability of attendance at two-year public
colleges.
2.6.2 Do All Merit Aid Programs Have the
Distributional Impact of HOPE?
Many of the merit programs are quite new. Of the seven programs ex-
amined in table 2.5, three had been operative for fewer than four years by
2000. In this section, I examine the four more mature programs—those
of Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, and Mississippi—in greater depth. An ad-
vantage of focusing on the older programs is that these states have suﬃ-
cient postprogram observations to allow for the ﬁner cuts of the data
needed to examine heterogeneity in the eﬀect of aid across demographic
groups. Given the strong impact of HOPE on the racial/ethnic gap in
schooling, it is of interest to examine whether the other programs have had
a similar impact.
In table 2.7, I examine how the eﬀect of the four programs varies by race
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Table 2.7 Eﬀect of Merit Aid on College Attendance Analysis by Race and
Ethnicity (October CPS, 1988–2000; Southern Census region)
Georgia Florida Arkansas Mississippi
(N   8,999) (N   10,213) (N   8,949) (N   8,969)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No time trends
Merit program .096 .001 .054 .002
(.014) (.022) (.023) (.011)
Merit   black/Hispanic –.030 .077 .045 .120
(.020) (.021) (.026) (.032)
R2 .059 .055 .061 .058
Time trends
Merit program .140 .030 .060 .016
(.013) (.021) (.024) (.015)
Merit   black/Hispanic –.147 .000 .043 .083
(.039) (.030) (.043) (.033)
R2 .056 .052 .059 .055
Notes: Speciﬁcation in “No time trends” is that of column (3) in table 2.2. Speciﬁcation in
“Time trends” adds trends estimated on pretreatment data. In each column, separate trends
are included for four groups: white-control, white-treat, nonwhite-control and nonwhite-
treat. In each column, sample consists of eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds in Southern Census
region, excluding states (other than the treatment state) that introduce a merit program by
2000. Standard errors in parentheses.and ethnicity. The control group is the nonmerit states. I show the results
of speciﬁcations that do and do not include preprogram time trends.30
While the estimates do change when time trends are included, and some are
quite imprecisely estimated, a consistent story emerges from the table. The
estimates are in concord with those of table 2.5, which showed that each of
these four programs had a strong impact on the college attendance rate.
However, table 2.7 shows that the relative eﬀects on blacks and Hispanics
diﬀer substantially across programs. In particular, Georgia is an outlier in
its relatively low eﬀect on blacks and Hispanics, as compared to its eﬀect
on whites.
Georgia’s HOPE has had the largest impact of all the state programs on
the college attendance of whites, with the estimated eﬀect ranging from 9.6
to 14.0 percentage points (without and with time trends, respectively).
Analogous eﬀects in the other states are substantially smaller, with no
state’s estimates for white non-Hispanics larger than 6 percentage points.
Further, the eﬀect of Georgia HOPE on blacks and Hispanics is 3.0 to 14.7
points lower than the eﬀect on whites. In the other three states, the esti-
mated eﬀect of merit aid on blacks and Hispanics is consistently more pos-
itive than its eﬀect on white non-Hispanics.
This is an important ﬁnding, as Georgia’s is the only program whose dis-
tributional eﬀect has been examined in depth, and the assumption has been
that, in other states, merit aid would similarly widen the racial gap in col-
lege attendance (see, e.g., Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2003 and Dy-
narski 2000). The results in table 2.7 indicate that the other mature merit
aid programs have not had this eﬀect, with nearly all of the estimates sug-
gesting that merit aid has actually narrowed the gap.
Why is Georgia diﬀerent? Its HOPE Scholarship diverges from the other
three programs in two key dimensions. First, of the four programs analyzed
in table 2.7, Georgia’s has the most stringent GPA requirements. Georgia
requires a high school GPA of 3.0, while Arkansas and Mississippi require
a GPA of only 2.5. Florida’s high school GPA requirement is similar to
Georgia’s, but its renewal requirements are less stringent. While Georgia
requires that a HOPE scholar maintain a GPA of 3.0 in college, in Florida
a college GPA of 2.75 allows a student to keep the scholarship. A college
GPA of 2.75 also qualiﬁes a student for renewal in Arkansas, and only a 2.5
is required in Mississippi.
Scholarship renewal rates for blacks are substantially lower than those
of whites in Georgia, indicating that the college GPA requirement hits
them particularly hard. Blacks at the University of Georgia are twice as
likely as whites to lose their scholarship after the freshman year (Healy
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30. In the analysis of each program, four preprogram trends are estimated: two for white
non-Hispanics (one for the treatment state and one for the control states) and two for blacks/
Hispanics (one for the treatment state and one for the control states).1997). A study at the Georgia Institute of Technology also found that
blacks were substantially more likely than whites to lose their scholarships.
This diﬀerential disappeared after accounting for diﬀerences in ability (as
measured by SAT scores; Dee and Jackson 1999). More generally, since
blacks and Hispanics have relatively low high school and college grades,
less stringent GPA requirements will disproportionately beneﬁt this group.
A second key diﬀerence between HOPE and the other state programs is
its treatment of other sources of aid and associated paperwork require-
ments for students potentially eligible for aid. During the period under
analysis, HOPE was reduced dollar for dollar by a student’s other aid, and
low-income students were required to ﬁll out extensive paperwork in order
to establish their eligibility for other aid. The net impact of these require-
ments was that lower-income students had to work harder for less aid than
their well-oﬀ counterparts.31 In stark contrast, Arkansas gives larger
awards to low-income students, by allowing students who receive the Pell
to keep their Academic Challenge Scholarships and by excluding from eli-
gibility students from families with incomes above $55,000.32
2.7 Additional Eﬀects of Merit Aid on Individuals and Institutions
The analysis in this paper has focused on the eﬀect of merit aid on two
critical margins: the decision to attend college and the type of college cho-
sen. I have touched on another outcome that is quite important, at least to
legislators: the decision to attend college within one’s home state. I have
found that merit aid moderately increases college attendance and shifts
students from two-year schools toward four-year schools. The data also
suggest that Georgia’s merit aid program has increased the probability that
a student will attend college in his or her home state. It remains to be de-
termined whether merit aid keeps those students in state after they have
completed their education, which is the ultimate goal of legislators who
hope to use merit aid to staunch a perceived “brain drain.” It also remains
to be settled whether the merit programs have increased completed school-
ing, as opposed to attempted schooling.33
There are many other margins of behavior that merit aid may aﬀect.
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31. Georgia recently eliminated this aspect of its program. As more data become available,
it will be of interest to examine whether this change has altered the distributional impact of
HOPE.
32. This is the income cutoﬀ for a family of four. Median income for a family of four in
Arkansas is $45,000, so a large share of students falls under these income guidelines.
33. Data limitations, rather than conceptual diﬃculties, hamper the analysis of this partic-
ular margin of behavior. At a minimum, we require data on the completed schooling of adults,
along with information about the state in which they graduated high school. As of 2002, these
data are not available in any survey large enough for informative analysis of the existing merit
programs. The 2000 Census microdata may prove useful in this context, and I am currently
examining this question using these data.Thoroughly addressing all of these potential eﬀects would expand this
lengthy chapter into a book. Here I will provide a necessarily brief discus-
sion of these issues.
2.7.1 Additional Eﬀects of Merit Aid on Individuals
A goal of merit aid is to increase academic eﬀort in high school and col-
lege. The carrot of merit aid may cause students to work harder in high
school and college in order to qualify for and then maintain their scholar-
ships. This increased eﬀort would be reﬂected in higher grades, test scores,
and college attendance rates. However, observed academic performance
may also improve for unintended reasons, in that pressure from students
and parents on teachers may lead to grade inﬂation at both the high school
and college level.
A small literature has examined the eﬀect of merit aid on academic
eﬀort. Henry and Rubenstein (2002) show that the average high school
GPA of freshmen entering the Georgia public universities rose from 2.73 in
1992 to 2.98 in 1999. In order to test whether this increase reﬂects greater
eﬀort or grade inﬂation, they examine SAT scores of entering freshmen,
which are not subject to the same parental and student pressures as high
school grades. The authors ﬁnd that the average SAT score of entering
freshmen in Georgia rose along with grades after HOPE was introduced,
from 968 to 1010. While these results are suggestive, they are not conclu-
sive, since this study examines only students in Georgia. It is quite possible
that the increases in grades and SAT scores in Georgia are part of a broader
secular trend rather than a consequence of HOPE.
Grades at the college level may also be aﬀected by merit aid. First, stu-
dents may work harder in their courses in order to keep their scholarships.
This is an intended eﬀect of the merit programs. Two unintended eﬀects
may also increase college grades. Professors may feel pressured to give
higher grades so as not to threaten their students’ continued eligibility for
HOPE, and students may choose less demanding course loads for the same
reason. Note that determining whether merit aid increases eﬀort in college
is inherently diﬃcult. While the SAT is a well-accepted metric of the prepa-
ration of high school students, there is no equivalent instrument used to
measure the achievement of college students.
Whether due to increased eﬀort, less demanding course loads, or grade
inﬂation, college grades at the University of Georgia are on the rise, with
the proportion of freshman grades below a B dropping from 40 percent in
1993 to 27 percent in 1996 (Healy 1997). In New Mexico, Binder and Gan-
derton (2002) found support for the hypothesis that this is due, in part, to
students taking fewer courses per semester, and therefore concentrating
more eﬀort on each course. They found support for the hypothesis that stu-
dents respond to a merit program by taking on less-demanding course
loads. They found that credit hours per semester dropped after the Success
90 Susan Dynarskiprogram was introduced. This work on New Mexico is the only conclusive
empirical research regarding the question of eﬀect of merit programs on
academic eﬀort in college.
Even the largest estimates of the eﬀect of merit aid on schooling deci-
sions suggest that the great majority of aid goes to inframarginal fami-
lies—that is, to families whose schooling decisions are unaﬀected by their
receipt of aid.34 For these families, of interest is which margins of behavior
are aﬀected by the windfall receipt of scholarship funds. Do students use
these funds to reduce the number of hours they work while in school? Do
they increase their spending on leisure activities? Do families save the
money, for retirement or later bequests to their children? One study sug-
gests that at least part of the money is used for increased current con-
sumption. Cornwell and Mustard (2002) examine new car registrations in
Georgia and comparison states and ﬁnd that car purchases rose faster in
Georgia after the introduction of HOPE than before. They reach similar
conclusions by examining the correlation between car registrations and the
number of HOPE recipients at the county level within Georgia, ﬁnding an
elasticity of new car registrations with respect to HOPE recipients of about
2 percent.
2.7.2 Impact of Merit Aid on Institutions
Dynarski (2000) compares the cost of attendance (room, board, tuition,
and fees) at four-year schools in Georgia to that in the rest of the South-
east. She concludes that prices rose faster at public schools in Georgia than
in comparable states after HOPE was introduced. Long (2002) subjects
this question to a more thorough analysis, controlling for college selectiv-
ity and state characteristics. She separately examines the various compo-
nents of the cost of attendance: tuition, room and board, and institutional
ﬁnancial aid. She ﬁnds that the increase in posted schooling prices in Geor-
gia is fully explained by increases in room and board, which are not cov-
ered by HOPE. Further, she ﬁnds that institutional ﬁnancial aid dropped
as a result of the introduction of HOPE. Long hypothesizes that schools
may have been under pressure from the state not to raise tuition, since any
increases here would have to be met by increased HOPE outlays. Increases
in room and board and drops in aid, however, could slip by with less atten-
tion. Private schools faced no such incentives to manipulate the form taken
by their price increases, and accordingly their price increases are more
evenly divided between tuition and room and board after HOPE.
Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2003) provide insight into how a merit
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34. It is important to note that merit aid is not unique in this way. Estimates of the eﬀects
of other forms of student aid also indicate that aid largely goes to those whose observable
schooling decisions are unaﬀected by the receipt of aid. Targeting of subsidies is a classic
topic of public economics; there is no transfer program that is 100 percent eﬀective in limit-
ing its subsidy to those whose decisions are contingent on the receipt of the subsidy.aid program aﬀects the composition of institutions of higher education.
They examine enrollment data for two- and four-year colleges in Georgia
and the rest of the Southeast. Their empirical results show how the chang-
ing schooling choices of Georgia’s young people translated into major
shifts in the demographic composition of Georgia’s schools. They ﬁnd that
enrollment expanded after the introduction of HOPE, relative to enroll-
ment in comparable states. They also ﬁnd a sharp rise in the enrollment of
black students at Georgia’s four-year colleges. Given the relatively small in-
crease in the college attendance rate of blacks found in the present analysis,
their increased presence at Georgia’s four-year colleges probably reﬂects a
shifting of black students from out-of-state colleges to Georgia schools.
2.8 The Politics and Finance of Merit Aid
State merit aid programs grew during the 1990s, a period characterized
by strong economic growth and overﬂowing state coﬀers. Recently, merit
programs have begun to feel the pinch of the recent economic downturn.
As state legislators struggle to balance their budgets, merit aid programs
dependent upon legislative appropriations (Arkansas, California, Louis-
iana, Maryland, and Mississippi) ﬁnd themselves in direct competition
with other state priorities such as elementary and secondary education and
health care. Arkansas, the ﬁrst state to introduce a broad-based merit aid
program, has temporarily closed the program to new enrollees. Although
current scholarship recipients can renew their awards, no new students are
being admitted to the program. Funding for Louisiana’s program barely
avoided the chopping block during the state’s last legislative session.
Those merit programs with committed revenue streams have been rela-
tively buﬀered from the economic and political eﬀects of the recession. Six
states (Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, West Virginia, South Carolina, and
Kentucky) fund their programs with revenues from a state lottery, while
two (Nevada and Michigan) use funds from the tobacco litigation settle-
ment. With their dedicated funding sources, merit aid in these states is not
vulnerable to legislators seeking to cut spending in the face of sinking tax
revenues. This puts merit aid in a unique position, since other sources of
funding for higher education at the state level are not protected in the same
way. For example, public universities are experiencing leaner times this ﬁs-
cal year as their state appropriations are reduced. Aid for low-income stu-
dents is also vulnerable. West Virginia’s need-based aid program could not
deliver scholarships to all those low-income students who were eligible
during the 2002–2003 academic year. The same year, the state’s new merit
program, which has no income cap, was launched with full funding.
A similar dynamic has emerged at the federal level. The fastest-growing
subsidies for college students—tax credits, savings tax incentives, and
loans—are programs whose funding is not contingent upon legislative ap-
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the most needy students, is determined by annual legislative appropriation.
While lottery funding protects merit aid funding from downturns in tax
revenue and associated drops in appropriations, using lotteries to fund
merit scholarship is a particularly regressive form of redistribution. The
high-achieving college students who receive merit funds are relatively
likely to be white and from upper-income families. Lottery spenders, by
contrast, tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the bottom of the
income distribution. Through both the revenue and spending channels,
then, lottery-funded merit programs are regressive in their impact.
Why have merit aid programs spread so rapidly and maintained such
strong political support? One possibility is that merit aid is a politically as-
tute way to build support for spending on postsecondary education. Con-
sider three alternatives for subsidizing college: merit aid, subsidized public
tuition, and need-based aid. Merit aid has a political advantage over low
tuition in that it has a high proﬁle. Parents (voters) generally do not un-
derstand that the public university tuition they pay is kept artiﬁcially low
by state appropriations to the schools. As a result, they may be unsympa-
thetic to legislative eﬀorts to increase funding through this route. If, in-
stead, their child receives a “scholarship” that pays for tuition, the per-
ceived beneﬁt is personal and immediate, inducing political support for the
spending. This gives merit- and need-based aid a political edge over tuition
subsidies as politically viable methods of subsidizing college costs.
A second dynamic gives merit aid an edge over the other subsidy options.
Since students “earn” merit aid, families may feel a more personal con-
nection to the program and ﬁght for its continuation. In this way, a merit
program is akin to Social Security: In both cases, voters are ﬁercely sup-
portive of transfers that they perceive as earned rewards rather than un-
conditional entitlements.
A third political advantage of merit aid, again held in common with So-
cial Security, is that it is broad based in its constituency. In most states, stu-
dents of any income level qualify for a merit scholarship as long as they
earn the required grades. All families are therefore potential recipients of,
and political supporters of, merit aid scholarships. By contrast, the bulk
of need-based aid ﬂows to a relatively narrow slice of the population. The
price of this highly progressive spending on need-based aid is that many
voters do not perceive themselves as its potential beneﬁciaries. William
Julius Wilson (1987) and Theda Skocpol (1991) have argued that robust
welfare states are characterized by beneﬁts that are widely available and,
therefore, widely supported. They argue that means-tested antipoverty
programs are politically weak because their scope is narrow. A similar dy-
namic could explain strong political support for merit-based aid paired
with weak political support for need-based aid.
Do these political realities indicate that a progressive aid system is po-
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“universal” programs can provide political cover for redistributive trans-
fers. As Social Security shows, a universal program can be layered with
transfers that channel extra dollars toward those with greater need. This
does not necessarily require new spending, as existing need-based pro-
grams could simply be relabeled in a way that enhances their political via-
bility. For example, federal need-based grants could be delivered to needy
students through the tax system by making the Hope and Lifetime Learn-
ing tax credits refundable.35 This would eliminate one layer of paperwork
(the FAFSA) yet allow aid eligibility to still be determined with the detailed
ﬁnancial information that is provided in tax ﬁlings. More important, fund-
ing for low-income students would be shifted into a program with broad-
based political appeal and a guaranteed funding stream.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper has examined how merit aid programs in seven states have
aﬀected an array of schooling decisions, with particular attention to how
the eﬀects have varied by race and ethnicity. I ﬁnd that merit aid programs
typically increase the attendance probability of college-age youths by 5 to
7 percentage points. The programs are therefore eﬀective at getting more
students into college. In fact, as I discuss presently, the merit programs ap-
pear to be more eﬀective than need-based aid at achieving this goal.
The merit programs also shift students toward four-year schools and
away from two-year schools. Why? Four-year colleges are far more expen-
sive than two-year colleges, but merit aid programs generally reduce the di-
rect cost (tuition and required fees) of each option to zero. It is therefore
expected that a greater proportion of students would choose the four-year
option than they would in the absence of merit aid. An open question is
whether this shift toward four-year colleges is socially beneﬁcial. Four-
year colleges are more expensive to run than two-year colleges, so a shift
toward these schools will increase the total cost of educating college stu-
dents. Further, marginal students who cannot handle the rigors of a four-
year college may drop out of school altogether, whereas at a two-year in-
stitution they may have received the support they needed to persist. A
countervailing factor is that some students who would not have considered
going on for a BA will do so once they are enrolled in a four-year school.36
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35. Those who assail the need-based aid system for its complex application process will
probably be horriﬁed by this suggestion, as the federal tax system is also notoriously complex.
But the Earned Income Tax Credit has proved to be an eﬀective mechanism for transferring
money to low-income families, and a refundable education tax credit has the potential to do
the same for low-income students.
36. Rouse (1995) addresses the eﬀect of community colleges on college entry and comple-
tion.The current analysis does not allow us to address which of these eﬀects
dominates.
The merit programs also appear to close racial and ethnic gaps in school-
ing, at least in three of the four states whose programs are old enough to al-
low analysis by race. Merit aid programs in Arkansas, Florida, and Mis-
sissippi have closed gaps, with Georgia’s the only program to widen them.
I attribute the Georgia program’s unique distributional eﬀect to its rela-
tively stringent academic requirements and a recently eliminated provision
that channeled the most generous scholarships to higher-income students.
This leaves open the question, however, of why merit aid does not simply
have a race-neutral eﬀect on schooling in states that do not have Georgia’s
unusual provisions.
One possible explanation for the role of merit aid in closing gaps in
schooling is the simplicity and transparency of these programs. First, these
programs are well publicized, and knowledge among potential recipients is
unusually high; one survey found that 70 percent of Georgia high school
freshmen could name the HOPE program without prompting, while 59
percent could identify its eligibility requirements (Henry, Harkreader,
Hutcheson, and Gordon 1998). Second, unlike need-based aid, merit aid
programs have minimal application procedures, and the applicant knows
at the time of application both whether he is eligible and the amount of the
award. By contrast, need-based aid requires that the applicant complete a
complicated set of forms and wait for months to ﬁnd out the actual award
amount, which is a complicated function of family ﬁnances.
Collecting information about college costs and completing application
forms may be particularly challenging to parents for whom English is a sec-
ond language or who have not gone to college themselves. A program with
low transaction and information costs may therefore ﬁnd a particularly
large response among nonwhite, low-income populations. This strong re-
sponse among the eligible may more than compensate for the fact that a
smaller proportion of nonwhites meet the academic requirements of merit
aid.
This interpretation of the present results is consistent with a set of stud-
ies that have shown little eﬀect of the need-based Pell Grant on schooling
decisions (e.g., Kane 1995; Hansen 1983) but a large eﬀect of simpler, more
transparent subsidy programs (e.g., Dynarski [2003] on the Social Security
student beneﬁt program and Kane [1994] on tuition prices). Kane and
Hansen both ﬁnd no impact of the need-based Pell Grant on college atten-
dance. By contrast, Kane, in his 1994 study, ﬁnds that tuition prices have a
substantial impact on college attendance. Dynarski ﬁnds that the Social
Security student beneﬁt program, which had minimal application require-
ments, had a large impact on college attendance and completed schooling.
Whereas a beneﬁt of a program with few paperwork requirements is that
it may move more youths into school, a cost is the loss of targeting. Unlike
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income students. A merit aid program is therefore relatively more costly to
run than need-based aid. However, a merit aid program is no more costly
than subsidized public tuition prices, which also beneﬁt students regard-
less of income. Further, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, merit aid
has a substantial advantage over both need-based aid and subsidized tu-
ition in that it has a broad and loyal base of political support in states that
have introduced the programs.
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Comment Charles Clotfelter
Susan Dynarski has written a well-crafted analysis of the eﬀect of state
merit aid programs on college attendance. She has employed variation over
time and across states in the utilization of merit aid programs to provide
very credible estimates of their enrollment eﬀects. Rather than pursue
points already well developed in her paper, I will note two aspects of the
general topic that I suspect were not really part of Dynarski’s charge in
writing her chapter but that nonetheless warrant further reﬂection by pol-
icy analysts and researchers. One is the distributional impact of these pro-
grams, and the other concerns the wider array of eﬀects emanating from
them and programs like them.
Before the introduction of the “new breed of merit aid,” states oﬀered ﬁ-
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Charles Clotfelter is Z. Smith Reynolds Professor of Public Policy Studies and professor of
economics and law at Duke University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.nancial aid largely in the form of low tuition levels and easy geographic ac-
cessibility. Rather than devise means-tested ﬁnancial aid of the form used
in federal aid programs or by private institutions using the federally en-
dorsed “uniform methodology,” most states have eschewed individually
tailored aid in favor of low tuitions across the board. As Hansen and Weis-
brod (1969) showed, however, this seemingly populist policy—combined
with a pattern of subsidies that favored elite public universities and admis-
sions standards that caused eligibility to be correlated with parental in-
come—has the eﬀect of aiding the aﬄuent rather than the poor. This was
the dominant policy of states until Arkansas, and then, most prominently,
Georgia, introduced a new form of state ﬁnancial aid, the Helping Out-
standing Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Scholarship. Fully consistent with
the nation’s (and especially the South’s) infatuation with using tangible re-
wards for spurring educational achievement and enabled by the revenues
produced by its new state lottery, Georgia oﬀered a striking new carrot to
its high school students: achieve a B average and receive in return a full-
tuition scholarship to any state college or university. (Those enrolling in
private institutions in the state received a stipend to cover a limited amount
of tuition.) As Dynarski makes clear, the program’s required grade point
average meant that a higher percentage of whites than blacks were eligible
to receive support. Though data on the incomes of students were not avail-
able, it was clear that this program also had a pro-middle-income impact
reminiscent of the California low-tuition policy studied by Hansen and
Weisbrod (1969). Two other features increased this tendency: the Pell
Grant recipients had their state awards reduced by the amount of these
grants, and the income ceiling on eligibility for the HOPE Scholarship Pro-
gram was eliminated in the program’s second year. Add to these pro-
aﬄuent aspects of the expenditure side of the program the regressivity of
the implicit tax on the revenue side, and you have a rather stunning distri-
butional impact. Putting aside whatever pro-poor eﬀect there might be in
legalizing the lottery, the policy choice to ﬁnance this merit aid program
with a heavy implicit tax paid disproportionately out of lower incomes is
quite remarkable. To be sure, Georgia appears to be an outlier in the way it
ﬁnanced and designed its merit aid program. But it is probably safe to say
that one eﬀect of the new breed of merit aid is a small but real redistribu-
tion of income.
A second point that Dynarski’s paper moves me to mention is the rather
uncontroversial assertion that enrollment eﬀects, as important as they may
be, are only one of a number of eﬀects likely to emanate from these new
state aid programs. In fact, Dynarski mentions several types of eﬀects. She
notes, for example, that the programs are likely to aﬀect not only the
propensity to enroll in college (and, more speciﬁcally, the propensity to go
to four-year institutions) but also students’ choices among institutions.
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spent just anywhere, however), aspiring college students might well be ex-
pected to make diﬀerent choices than they would have in the absence of the
program. She notes as well that merit programs, as a result of new patterns
of enrollment, might inﬂuence the racial composition of institutions. And,
she notes, merit aid programs could impact other forms of aid provided by
states or, indeed, other state policies. A ﬁnal eﬀect that she mentions, one
in line with the so-called Bennett hypothesis that “greedy colleges” would
respond to increases in aid simply by raising tuition, is the possibility that
a generous new merit aid program might inspire institutions, both public
and private, to raise their tuitions.
This said, I would argue that there are yet other eﬀects that might result
from the introduction of this new breed of merit program. Because eligi-
bility for these scholarships is contingent on a high level of academic per-
formance in high school, one might surely expect such a program to inﬂu-
ence the eﬀort expended by students in high school. In light of the ﬁnancial
rewards available, we might also expect parents to oﬀer encouragement to
their high school children beyond the normal level of parental hectoring.
Once in college, successful scholarship holders must confront the prospect
of further academic performance requirements for them to retain their
scholarships. Thus one would reasonably expect another set of eﬀects, in-
cluding those on the amount of eﬀort devoted to study and on the choice
of a major. Average grades awarded in various departments can diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly within a single college, and it should not be surprising that un-
dergraduates pay attention to such diﬀerences, especially when ﬁnancial
repercussions are added to the other consequences of making low grades.
For their part, institutions might respond to these pressures by allowing
grades to inﬂate. Eﬀects on the choice of major and on grades suggest an-
other eﬀect—the likelihood that students will stay on to graduate.
Another set of eﬀects would arise out of the altered composition of stu-
dent bodies. If, as appears to be the case, these programs raise the average
academic qualiﬁcation of students at some state schools, the learning envi-
ronments there could be altered, depending on what kinds of peer eﬀects
are at work. The changes in composition might also aﬀect the institutions’
ability to recruit and retain talented faculty. One might also imagine that
the surge in demand by qualiﬁed students might cause some institutions to
confront questions such as whether to establish new or revise existing en-
rollment caps.
Susan Dynarski’s chapter represents a useful and insightful contribution
to a volume focusing on decisions about college. She shows that one new
form of state aid program, one based on measured achievement rather than
ﬁnancial need, has aﬀected the decisions of many college applicants about
whether and where to attend college. My comments have touched on two
The New Merit Aid 99related sets of questions that I view as interesting extensions, not important
omissions.
References
Hansen, L., and B. Weisbrod. 1969. The distribution of costs and direct beneﬁts of
public higher education: The case of California. Journal of Human Resources 4
(Summer): 176–191.
100 Susan Dynarski